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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
exclusive so long as there is procedural incapacity for the wife
or children to sue, but once removed (as following a divorce),
there is no reason for denying individual action. Again, the
simple fact is that the individuals who are deprived or neglected
are the ones most anxious to collect and would be most efficient
in collecting arrearages. Also, normal means of enforcing judg-
ments-levying property or garnishing wages-would seem to be
a more humane means of enforcement than using the statute's
contempt provisions for imposing a non-supporting father, who
is not likely to be able to earn money to support his family while
in "debtor's prison."
It would seem, therefore, that the technical problems evi-
denced in this case and discussed here would be best solved by
reducing the immunity from suit now granted the husband, and
by allowing the wife and/or minor children to sue during the
existence of the marriage. In the absence of this it would seem
that a reversal of this case would be in order, or a change in the
legislation making it clear that "civil" courts can entertain suits
seeking to make executory judgments of "criminal" courts order-
ing support payments under article 75.
PROPERTY
A. N. Yiannopoulos
Public Things; Navigable Waterbottoms
In Carter v. Moore,' the Louisiana Supreme Court had the
opportunity to reconsider the scope of application of Act 62 of
1912,2 as interpreted in California Co. v. Price.8 The matter was
discussed extensively in the last issue of this Review. It suffices
to state here that the majority opinion deserves attention, be-
cause, in effect, it attributes to Act 62 of 1912 a narrower scope
of application than that suggested by the Price decision. Thus it
is now clear that when a defective patent is cancelled at the
request of a successor to the original patentee, neither the 1912
repose statute nor Price may be invoked to compel re-issuance
of the original patent. The Carter decision, however, is much
1. 258 La. 921, 248 So.2d 813 (1971).
2. See La. Acts 1912, No. 62, now R.S. 9:5661 (1950). For detailed dis-
cussion, see A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY, § 32 (1965); Yiannopoulos,
Validity of Patents Conveying Navigable Waterbottoms; Act 62 of 191$,
Price, Carter and All That, 32 IA. L. REv. 1 (1971).
3. 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954).
[Vol. 32
1972] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1970-1971 173
more important than its peculiar facts might suggest. A monu-
mental concurring opinion by Justice Barham and Justice Tate's
concurrence in denial of a rehearing indicate that patents con-
taining erroneous or ambiguous descriptions may be generally
assailable, and thus foreshadow the ultimate decline and fall of
the Price decision.
"Constructions" as Immovables by Nature
According to the Louisiana Civil Code, tracts of land,4
standing trees and crops,5 and buildings or other constructions6
are immovables by nature. What constitutes "buildings" and
"other constructions" that may qualify as immovables by nature
under article 464 of the Civil Code is left, in the absence of legis-
lative definition, for judicial determination according to prevail-
ing notions in society.
A review of the jurisprudence indicates that courts have
classified as immovables by nature under article 464 of the Code
an advertising sign imbedded in concrete, 7 a truck body,8 a tractor
shed and poultry house,9 a canal, 10 a cistern," a brick pit,12 a corn
mill,18 gasoline tanks,' 4 and a chicken broiler house.' 5 Generali-
zations as to the applicable criteria in light of this spotty juris-
prudence may be misleading; yet, analysis confirms that courts
4. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 464; A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 43
(1965).
5. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 465; Ylannopoulos, Standing Crops; Movablea
or Immovables?, 17 LOYOLA L. REV. 323 (1971).
6. See LA. Civu, CODE art. 464; Yiannopoulos, Railroad Tracks as Im-
movables by Nature; Ruminations on American Creosote Company v.
Springer, 19 LA. B. J. 37 (1971). The discussion in text is largely based on
this article, but the importance of the Springer case warrants a degree of
repetition.
7. Industrial Outdoor Displays v. Reuter, 162 So.2d 160 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964).
8. Ballard's, Inc. v. Evans, 241 So.2d 557 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
9. Prevot v. Courtney, 241 La. 313, 129 So.2d 1 (1961). See also Lafleur
v. Foret, 213 So.2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) (chicken sheds).
10. Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. Board of State Affairs, 154 La. 988,
98 So. 552 (1923).
11. Polhman v. DeBouchel, 32 La. Ann. 1158 (1880).
12. Folse v. Loreauville Sugar Factory, 156 So. 667 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1934).
13. Bigler v. Brashear, 11 Rob. 484 (La. 1845).
14. Holicer Gas Co., Inc. v. Wilson, 45 So.2d 96 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950);
Monroe Auto & Supply Co. v. Cole, 6 La. App. 337 (2d Cir. 1927). But see
Edwards v. S. & R. Gas Co., 73 So.2d 590 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954); LA. R. S.
9:1106 (Supp. 1971).
15. Flowers v. Patton, 230 So.2d 654 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
have taken into account the size of the structure,0 its degree of
integration with the soil,1'7 and its permanent nature.5 In the
absence of these elements, a construction will be declared to be
a movable. 19
Question has arisen as to whether railroad tracks may be
immovables by nature as "constructions" under article 464 of the
Civil Code.20 The question was answered in the affirmative in
Morgan's Louisiana & Texas Railroad & Steamship Co. v. Hima-
laya Planting & Mfg. Co.21 This case involved a claim of a ven-
dor's privilege over railroad iron sold by plaintiff to the defen-
dant. The court held that the vendor's privilege was lost as a
result of the incorporation of the railroad iron into the land and
its becoming an immovable by nature under article 464. The
Morgan case was expressly overruled, however, by Caldwell v.
Laurel Grove Co.2 2 The Caldwell case involved a dispute be-
tween an unpaid vendor of railroad iron that had been incor-
porated into a tract of land, and a mortgage creditor of the pur-
chaser of the iron. When the mortgage creditor foreclosed, the
unpaid vendor intervened. There was no question as to the ap-
plication of the public records doctrine or loss of the privilege
by transfer of the land to another person because the land had
not changed hands. The holding of the case is that insofar as an
unpaid vendor is concerned, immobilization is immaterial if the
things sold are in the possession of the purchaser, may be iden-
16. See Ballard's, Inc. v. Evans, 241 So.2d 557 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970);
Lafleur v. Foret, 213 So.2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
17. See Industrial Outdoor Displays v. Reuter, 162 So.2d 160 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964); Monroe Auto & Supply Co. v. Cole, 6 La. App. 337 (2d Cir.
1927); of. American Creosote Co. v. Springer, 257 La. 116, 241 So.2d 510
(1970).
18. See Ballard's, Inc. v. Evans, 241 So.2d 557 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
In France, constructions erected on the occasion of an exhibition are re-
garded as immovables by nature, even though destined to be demolished.
Temporary barracks and tents, however, erected on the occasion of a
short-lived fair, are regarded as movables. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT,
TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANcAIS no 77 (2d ed. 1952).
19. See Jones v. Conrad, 154 La. 860, 98 So. 397 (1923) (derrick was a
temporary structure, and, therefore, not an immovable by nature under
article 464). See also Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Cash Grocery & Sales
Co., 150 So. 57 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933) (railroad track a temporary structure
under the terms of a contract; hence, not an immovable by nature). This
case must now be regarded as overruled by American Creosote Co. v.
Springer, 257 La. 116, 241 So.2d 510 (1970).
20. Railroad tracks may certainly be immovables by destination under
articles 468 and 469 of the Civil Code. See Woodward v. American Exposition
Ry., 39 La. Ann. 566, 2 So. 413 (1887); The State v. Mexican Gulf Ry.,
3 Rob. 513 (La. 1843).
21. 143 La. 460, 78 So. 735 (1918).
22. 175 La. 928, 144 So. 718 (1932).
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tified, and can be removed without damage to themselves and
to the property into which they are incorporated. In American
Creosote Co. v. Springer,23 the Louisiana Supreme Court over-
ruled Caldwell and reinstated Morgan as a valid precedent.
In Springer a question arose as to whether the sale of a tract
of land "with buildings and improvements" included also railroad
trackage belonging to a person other than the vendor. The act of
sale made no mention of the railroad trackage, but plaintiff, the
vendor, claimed that the act had been passed with the under-
standing between the parties that the trackage was not included.
Further, plaintiff claimed that the trackage had been leased from,
and belonged to, the Illinois Central Railroad Company in ac-
cordance with the terms of a written (though unrecorded) lease
of which the purchaser was aware and that, as a result of de-
fendant's acts, plaintiff became obligated to Illinois Central in
the amount of an indemnity bond securing execution of the terms
of the lease. Plaintiff demanded a money judgment to cover his
loss, that is, the amount of the indemnity bond. Defendant,
claiming that the railroad trackage was immovable property the
title to which had passed to him along with the land since he
had bought on the faith of the public records, filed an exception
of no cause of action. The court of appeal affirmed a judgment
sustaining defendant's exception. 24 The railroad trackage, the
court declared, was an immovable by nature as a construction
under article 464 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Therefore, in the
absence of recorded claims against it, the trackage passed along
with the land to the purchaser who had relied on the public
records; moreover, the court declared, parol evidence would be
inadmissible to contradict the terms of an authentic act of sale.
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari25 and affirmed. 26
The case involves highly interesting questions concerning,
generally, the basis and effects of a classification of things as
immovables by nature under article 464 of the Civil Code. "Ra-
tionally," the supreme court declared, "a railroad track must be
regarded as a 'construction' under Article 464 of the Civil Code;
it is so regarded in France under the corresponding article of the
23. 257 La. 116, 241 So.2d 510 (1970).
24. 232 So.2d 532 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); The Work of the Louis4ana
Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Property, 31 LA. L. REv. 196, 206
(1970).
25. 255 La. 803, 233 So.2d 247 (1969).
26. 257 La. 116, 241 So.2d 510 (1970).
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Napoleonic Code .... [T]his 'trackage' or railroad is firmly in-
corporated into the ground and must be regarded as an immov-
able by nature-a component part of the land .... ,,2" There
was no proof that the railroad iron in question had been "firmly
incorporated" into the ground, but the court drew an inference
of fact from the dictionary meaning of the word "trackage" that
had been repeatedly used in the petition. The court thus seemed
to indicate that if plaintiff had used the words "railroad iron"
instead of "trackage" proof of firm incorporation would be re-
quired. The court obviously stressed the idea that firm incor-
poration is a prerequisite for immobilization under article 464,
although the firm incorporation may be inferred from the alle-
gations of the parties.
A finding that a thing has become an immovable by nature
under article 464 is ordinarily determinative of what has been
included in a transfer or encumbrance of a tract of land or a
building.28 Naturally, if parties wish to exclude from the sale
or encumbrance certain things that have become immovables,
they are certainly free to do so; but if they say nothing about
them, they are transferred or encumbered with the land. It
makes no difference that these things may belong to a third
person or may be burdened with a vendor's privilege. The owner
of the things or the unpaid vendor has ways and means to pro-
tect his interest in things that are located on the land of another. 29
If he does nothing of the sort, he incurs the risk of losing his in-
terest in case of sale of the land to innocent third persons who
rely on the public records.30
A number of questions arise in connection with the preser-
vation of security interests on movables that have been incor-
porated into the land of another, and especially in connection
with the vendor's privilege. When the things sold become im-
27. Id. at 128, 241 So.2d at 514-15.
28. See A. YMANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 57 (1965).
29. In the Springer case, the supreme court declared that "[aln appro-
priate document properly recorded which would have placed Springer on
notice and compelled him to acquire the land and railroad subject to the
rights of the Railroad Company would have sufficed. La. Civ. Code art. 2266.
Since this was not done, Springer acquired the land free of any claim the
Railroad Company might have to the land or any construction thereon
which had become immovable by nature." 257 La. 116, 128, 241 So.2d 510,
515 (1970).
30. See American Creosote Co. v. Springer, 257 La. 116, 241 So.2d 510
(1970); Prevot v. Courtney, 241 La. 313, 129 So.2d 1 (1961); Industrial Out-
door Displays v. Reuter, 162 So.2d 160 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
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movables by destination under article 468 and 469 of the Civil
Code, the unpaid vendor may exercise his right of dissolution
and his privilege, provided of course that the things are in the
possession of the purchaser, may be identified, and may be re-
moved without substantial damage to themselves or to the struc-
tures to which they have been attached.81 But when the things
sold become immovables by nature under article 464, most Lou-
isiana decisions indicate that the vendor's privilege and right of
dissolution are lost either as a matter of law8 2 or upon a finding
that the things sold cannot be removed without damage.-" In
Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co.,34 however, the supreme court
declared that immobilization under article 464 is immaterial in-
sofar as the vendor is concerned and that the right of dissolution
and privilege are preserved if the things sold are, as a matter of
fact, removable without damage.
The Springer case does not concern directly the vendor's
right of dissolution and privilege on the things sold. Neverthe-
less, since it overruled Caldwell, it gives rise to serious questions
concerning its effect on vendor's rights. Does the overruling of
Caldwell change the law insofar as the unpaid vendor is con-
cerned? Argument might be made that classification of a railroad
track as immovable by nature and the effect of this classification
on the unpaid vendor's rights are distinct matters. The things
sold might be immovables as to everyone, including the unpaid
vendor, but the unpaid vendor might still obtain satisfaction by
preferential treatment when the things are still in the possession
of the purchaser, may be identified, and can be removed without
damage. It is submitted, however, that the Louisiana Supreme
31. For detailed discussion, see A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§
56, 107-09 (1965).
32. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Himalaya Planting & Mfg.
Co., 143 La. 460, 78 So. 735 (1918); Gary v. Burguieres, 12 La. Ann. 227
(1857); W. M. Bailey & Sons v. Western Geophysical Co., 66 So.2d 424 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1953); cf. Lighting Fixture & Supply Co. v. Pacific Ins. Co.,
176 La. 499, 514, 146 So. 35, 39 (1932) (concurring opinion by O'Niell, C.J.).
Use of the chattel mortgage device has obviated this difficulty for those
who will go into the trouble and expense of using it.
33. See Milliken & Farwell v. Roger, 138 La. 823, 70 So. 848 (1916); In re
Receivership of Augusta Sugar Co., 434 La. 971, 64 So. 870 (1914); Monroe
Auto & Supply Co. v. Cole, 6 La. App. 337 (2d Cir. 1927).
34. 175 La. 928, 940, 144 So. 718, 721 (1932): "When the rails and other
materials were sold to the owner of the plantation, they were impressed
with the vendor's privilege, and It is difficult for us to see how the privilege
can be defeated by the use the vendee made of them, since they are not
appreciably affected by such use."
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Court intended to overrule Caldwell in all respects.35 With Cald-
well out of the way, the vendor loses his privilege and right of
dissolution if the things sold have become immovables by nature
under article 464 of the Civil Code. This result is compatible
with notions of economic utility and does not leave the unpaid
vendor without any protection.36
The Springer case is a landmark decision and has far-reach-
ing effects on Louisiana property law as it strengthens security
of title and acquisition, discourages separate ownership of the
ground and its component parts, and makes it clear that the
public records doctrine applies to all things that are immovables
by nature under article 464 of the Civil Code. In these respects,
the decision does not change the law; it merely articulates and
expands existing trends. It changes the classification of railroad
tracks and the law governing a vendor's privilege on things that
have become immovables by nature under article 464 of the
Civil Code. The change is rational.
Avulsion; New Riverbed
In Dickson v. Sandefur,37 question arose as to the proper
interpretation and application of articles 509, 510, 511, and 518 of
the Civil Code. Plaintiff owned Sunflower Plantation on the east
side of Red River. A part of the plantation was a peninsula, con-
sisting principally of alluvion; it was bounded to the north, west,
and south by Red River. The river had been eating away at the
narrow neck at the east of the peninsula. In 1945 one of the
greatest floods in the history of Red River occurred. As the flood
increased in activity, the caving of the banks at the side intensi-
fied and Red River cut through the peninsula, opening a new
bed through the base of the peninsula. For some time the river
flowed both around the peninsula in its old bed and across the
neck of the peninsula in its new bed. Finally, the flow of the
river totally abandoned its old bed.
35. Caldwell has been overruled without qualification. Moreover, the court
declared that immovables by nature "form an economic unity with the
ground and in principle, are not susceptible to separate real rights," that
"party intention carries little weight," and that "if a thing is an immovable
by nature, it Is immovable as to everyone." American Creosote Co., Inc. v.
Springer, 257 La. 116, 127, 129, 241 So.2d 510, 514, 515 (1970).
36. See Yiannopoulos, Railroad Tracks as Immovables by Nature; Rumi-
nations on American Creosote Co. v. Springer, 19 LA. B.J. 37, 48 (1971).
37. 250 So.2d 709 (La. 1971). Facts are stated as found by the Louisiana
Supreme Court.
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Across the river to the south from Sunflower Plantation was
a large peninsula known as Eagle Bend Plantation, whose record
title was in the defendant (plaintiff in reconvention). Because
of the erosion for many years on the eastern bank of the river,
there had been extensive accretion to the extreme end of the
Eagle Bend Plantation, known as Eagle Bend Point. The allu-
vion, though of considerable height in places, consisted mostly
of sand and did not support vegetation. During the 1945 flood,
the river cut across Eagle Bend Point, leaving to the east of its
new bed a strip of permanent high land that extended from the
new eastern bank to the former western high bank and alluvion
attached to it. Immediately after the floodwaters subsided, the
north end of the old river had become silted up and closed off
so that there was no flow through the old channel.
Plaintiff instituted a possessory action claiming the old aban-
doned bed of the Red River around Sunflower peninsula and the
land between that bed and the new bed of the river across the
same peninsula. Defendant, owner of the Eagle Bend Plantation,
filed by reconventional demand a petitory action in which he
claimed ownership of the old bed of the river around Eagle Bend
Point as well as all the land lying between the old bed and the
new bed across Eagle Bend Plantation. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of plaintiff in his possessory action and dis-
missed defendant's reconventional demand. The court of appeal
amended and affirmed.88 The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed
in part and reversed in part: plaintiff was entitled to judgment
in his possessory action and defendant, plaintiff in reconvention,
in his petitory action.
In a scholarly opinion which deserves attention for both its
methodology and substantive qualities, Justice Barham re-ex-
amined the historical background of article 518 of the Civil Code
in the light of copious Roman and French sources. He distin-
guished clearly between "avulsion" (article 511) and formation
of a new river bed (article 518); and, after properly concluding
that there was no question of avulsion in the case under consid-
eration, he stated firmly that common law authorities dealing
with the comparable notions of avulsion and cutoffs are not to
be relied upon for the interpretation of articles 511 and 518 of
the Civil Code. Actually, the "Court of Appeal erred by resorting
38. 235 So.2d 579 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
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to common law principles and by misinterpreting avulsion under
Louisiana law."3 9
The court made it clear that article 518 applies "when a river
changes and abandons its old course, not imperceptibly or gradu-
ally and slowly over a long period of time but in such a manner
as to be readily perceived in a departure not requiring the pas-
sage of much time, and finds a completely new bed by occupying
other land."40 It is not required that there be a cutoff in the
common law sense.41 Indeed,
"[T]here need not remain between the old bed and the new
bed a piece of ground which also belongs to the one through
whose land the new bed has been formed. The new bed can
be formed from lands of one owner although lands of many
others lie between his land and the old bed. The one who
loses land to the new bed still takes the old bed of the river
by indemnification no matter how removed and without
need for him to have been a riparian owner along the old
bed while it still contained flowing water. Riparian owner-
ship plays no part in the application of Civil Code Article
518."42
In the light of these principles, defendant (plaintiff in reconven-
tion) was entitled to the old bed of the river and to the land
between the old channel and the new channel.
Predial Servitudes
Article 659 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 and corre-
sponding article 639 of the French Civil Code declare that "ser-
vitudes arise either from the natural situation of the places,
from the obligations imposed by law, or from contract between
the respective owners. ' 43 In Louisiana and in France, therefore,
servitudes may be natural, arising from the situation of the
places;44 legal, imposed by law; 45 and conventional, arising from
39. 250 So.2d 709, 718 (La. 1971).
40. Id. at 719.
41. A cutoff may be defined as "the action of a river when it makes a
new bed by cutting through land and leaves a portion of that land between
the new bed and the old bed of the river." Dickson v. Sandefur, 250 So.2d
709, 718 (La. 1971).
42. Id. at 720.
43. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 659; FRENCH Crv. CODE art. 639 (1804).
44. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 660-663; FRENCH Crv. CODE arts. 640-648 (1804).
45. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 664-708; FRENCH CIv. CODE arts. 649-685 (1804).
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juridical acts, destination of the owner, or acquisitive prescrip-
tion.46
Natural Servitudes
In Poole v. Guste,47 plaintiff brought suit for injunctive re-
lief, mandatory and prohibitory, and for damages resulting from
the obstruction by defendant of a servitude of drain. Plaintiff
claimed that he was entitled to a natural servitude of drain under
article 660 of the Civil Code; in the alternative, plaintiff claimed
that he was entitled to the same servitude by acquisitive pre-
scription under articles 709 and 765 of the Civil Code. The court
found that defendant's estate was situated below, and that plain-
tiff's estate was therefore entitled to a natural servitude of drain.
The court refrained from reaching a decision as to the existence
of a conventional servitude of drain, but the tenor of the opinion
suggests that such a servitude did exist in fact. The opinion re-
iterated the rule that the owner of the servient estate may im-
prove his property, but not to the injury of the dominant estate.4
Legal Servitudes; Passage
In Arcuri v. Cali,49 plaintiff sued for the recognition of a
servitude and for an injunction prohibiting interference with that
servitude. The servitude had been created by an act of sale
whereby the seller of a tract of land had reserved a servitude
of passage in favor of his remaining lands. Had such a servitude
not been reserved, the lands of the seller would have been com-
pletely enclosed. Plaintiff claimed that he had reserved a legal
servitude of passage, which is imprescriptible.5 The trial court
found that the seller had indeed reserved a legal servitude, but
held that the servitude no longer existed because the dominant
estate had ceased to be enclosed. In a sound opinion, the court
of appeal held that a conventional rather than legal servitude had
been reserved, which was recorded and, therefore, effective to-
ward successors of the original parties. However, since the parties
46. See Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes; General Principles: Louisiana
and Comparative Law, 29 LA. L. Rv. 1, 43 (1968).
47. 246 So.2d 353 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 258 La. 760, 247
So.2d 861 (1971).
48. See Nicholson v. Holloway Planting Co., 255 La. 1, 229 So.2d 679 (1969);
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Property,
31 LA. L. REv. 196, 216 (1971).
49. 244 So.2d 309 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
50. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 699, 708.
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had pleaded and answered the wrong cause and the question of
the termination of a conventional servitude had not been properly
considered, the case was remanded for the taking of any addi-
tional evidence that either party might desire to submit on the
termination of the servitude. The case illustrates the significance
of article 2164 of the Code of Civil Procedure that suppressed the
"theory of the case" doctrine; justice may now be achieved even
if parties plead and answer the wrong cause.
In Inabnet v. Pipes,51 plaintiff demanded that an existing
right of way over defendant's property be changed to a more
adequate and convenient right of way over the same property.
Plaintiff's estate was enclosed, and the existing right of way had
been granted by defendant voluntarily. From a judgment sus-
taining an exception of no cause of action, plaintiff appealed.
Defendant appellee claimed that the estate was not enclosed
within the meaning of article 699 of the Civil Code because, ac-
cording to appellant's allegations, it was bounded by Bayou
DeSiard-a "water course"; further, appellee claimed that relo-
cation of the right of way was excluded by article 703 of the
Civil Code, which declares that "when the place for the passage
is once fixed, he to whom this servitude has been granted can
not change it." The court of appeal overruled the exception of
no cause of action and remanded the case to the trial court for a
determination on the merits. The court correctly held that the
term "water course" in article 699 "was intended by the redactors
of the code to mean a navigable stream or body of water by which
ingress and egress might be effected." 52 Further, the court held,
on the authority of Bouis v. Watts,8 that one has the right to de-
mand a new passage upon showing that an existing road is im-
passable for vehicular traffic during certain seasons of the year.
Hence, the exception of no cause of action should have been over-
ruled. The disposition of the case is correct, though the reliance
on Bouis is a questionable ground of decision. In Bouis the es-
tate was in fact enclosed and plaintiff had merely managed to
reach his land by climbing fences on the property of third per-
sons. In Inabnet the court should have grounded its decision on
a proper interpretation of articles 702 and 703 of the Civil Code.
Article 702 makes it clear that the owner of an enclosed estate
is entitled to a passage that is capable of carrying vehicular traf-
51. 241 So.2d 595 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
52. Id. at 597.
53. 25 So.2d 18 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946); 29 So.2d 783 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
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fic. Article 703 forbids the relocation of a right of way merely
to suit the convenience of the dominant estate; it does not ex-
clude relocation of a right of way when there is necessity for
relocation.5
4
Legal Servitudes; Sic Utere
In Chaney v. Travelers Insurance Co.,55 the Louisiana Su-
preme Court had the opportunity to re-examine the proper inter-
pretation and scope of application of article 667 of the Civil Code.
Plaintiff brought action against parish authorities and a contrac-
tor and his insurer for the recovery of damages to his home. He
alleged that works undertaken for the improvement of a canal
by the parish and its contractor necessitated the use of heavy
equipment in close proximity to his house, and that vibrations
caused the interior sheetrock and plaster to crack near doors and
windows. The court of appeal affirmed a judgment against the
parish and reversed a judgment in favor of the parish against
the contractor and his insurer. The Louisiana Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed in part. According to the supreme
court, the parish was liable to plaintiff under article 667 of the
Civil Code in solido with its contractor; the contractor was liable
in indemnity to the parish, but only to the extent that the parish
was liable to plaintiff under article 667.
The contractor argued that plaintiff could not recover be-
cause neither negligence nor other fault had been shown on the
part of the parish or its contractor. Strict liability under article
667 of the Civil Code could not arise because, according to Rey-
mond v. State,16 this article is inapplicable when activities as
distinguished from works cause damage to adjacent owners.
Hence, because the parish was not liable to plaintiff, the con-
tractor was not liable to the parish. In a scholarly opinion, Justice
Summers, writing for the majority, repudiated the narrow inter-
pretation of article 667 in the Reymond decision and attributed
to article 667 its broad historical meaning which includes damage
54. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no 911
(2d ed. Picard 1952). Further, article 703 presupposes a passage that has been
"fixed" by judicial decision or by agreement of the parties. The passage is
not "fixed" when the owner of the servient estate merely tolerates a use by
the owner of the enclosed estate.
55. 249 So.2d 181 (La. 1971).
56. 255 La. 425, 231 So.2d 375 (1970), discussed, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Property, 31 LA. L. Rsv. 196, 217
(1971).
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caused by works as well as damage by activities on neighboring
property. Justices Tate and Barham concurred.
Justice Summers' opinion deserves attention because it re-
establishes a clear correspondence between doctrine and juris-
prudence in the best civilian tradition. Relying upon impressive
commentary, Justice Summers declared that:
"Article 667 is therefore a limitation the law imposes upon
the rights of proprietors in the use of their property. It is
a species of legal servitude in favor of neighboring property,
an expression of the principle of sic utere. An activity, then,
which causes damage to a neighbor's property obliges the
actor to repair the damage, even though his actions are pru-
dent by usual standards. It is not the manner in which the
activity is carried on which is significant; it is the fact that
the activity causes damage to a neighbor which is relevant
.... And the proprietor is likewise responsible not only
for his own activity, but also for that carried on by his agents,
contractors and representatives with his consent and per-
mission. This liability which the law imposes attaches also
to the agent or contractor, who, as in this case, becomes so]l-
darily liable with the proprietor . . . 7
Turning to the Reymond decision, Justice Summers pointed out
that "there is, in fact, no majority opinion by this Court in the
Reymond case on the reasons for judgment, only on the result
reached," that "any statements relating to Article 667 are . . .
dicta," and that the dissent of Justice Sanders in Reymond is
adopted instead of "the interpretation placed upon Article 667
by the opinion in Reymond."58
In his concurring opinion, Justice Tate pointed out that the
contractor was clearly liable to the parish under an indemnifi-
cation agreement; thus, since it was not necessary for the court
to consider the possible application of article 667 and the correct-
ness of Reymond, the majority opinion in Chaney was "dicta." 59
Justice Barham agreed generally with Justice Tate and sought
to explain the purpose of Reymond, which was "to establish a
relational basis upon which we could, without distortion of the
57. 249 So.2d 181, 186 (La. 1971); accord, Guillot v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co.,
243 So.2d 820 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
58. 249 So.2d 181, 184 (La. 1971).
59. Id. at 187.
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codal provisions, determine the liability in cases involving in-
herently dangerous constructions and ultra-hazardous activi-
ties." &O Further, Justice Barham took issue with the statement
in the majority opinion that "this liability which the law im-
poses attaches also to the agent or contractor, who, as in this
case, becomes solidarily liable with the proprietor if this activity
causes damage to a neighbor," and pointed out that "the majority
cites no law for this latter holding."' 1
The majority opinion in Chaney embodies a number of prop-
ositions that are pertinent for future interpretations of article
667: this article imposes liability for damage resulting from works
as well as activities on neighboring property; the liability is
strict, in the sense that it does not depend on proof of negligence
or other fault; the word "proprietor" includes a public body that
has a right of servitude rather than full ownership; and the pro-
prietor is solidarily liable with his servants and other persons
acting with his consent and permission. Some of these proposi-
tions require comment.
It has long been established in Louisiana jurisprudence and
doctrine that article 667 imposes a species of strict liability62 for
damage resulting from works or activities on neighboring prop-
erty. Since the word "fault" in article 2315 was generally under-
stood to mean "negligence" and "intentional misconduct," Lou-
isiana courts resorted to article 667 in cases in which imposition
of strict liability seemed warranted. In the process, the narrow
terms of article 667 were often disregarded, so that one may
justifiedly assert that the article was being applied by analogy
rather than literally.," In Langlois v. Allied Chemical Co.,04
however, decided the same day as Chaney, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court expanded the concept of "fault" in article 2315 to in-
clude liability for ultra-hazardous activities without negligence,
namely, liability based on the notion of "risk." A question
arises, therefore, as to the interrelationship of articles 2315 and
667. Specifically, does the broadened notion of fault under article
2315 render the notion of strict liability under article 667 un-
60. Id. at 188.
61. Id.
62. See Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., 258 La. 1067, 1075, 1082, 249
So.2d 133, 137, 139 (1971), and cases cited therein.
63. See concurring opinion by Justice Barham in Chaney v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 249 So.2d 181, 188 (La. 1971).
64. 258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133 (La. 1971).
65. See 2 RIPERT ET BOULANGER, TRAIT DE DROrr cwL no. 334 (1957).
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necessary? It is submitted that this is not the case: the two pro-
visions may overlap in part but continue to establish distinct
grounds of liability. Article 2315 establishes liability under the
law of delictual obligations for injuries to persons, property, and
relations; article 667 establishes liability for property damage in
the context of neighborhood, namely, in accordance with rules
of property law. It is conceivable that liability may rest on either
article exclusively or on both cumulatively. Indeed, a plaintiff
may satisfy the terms and conditions of both articles and may
have two distinct causes of action for a single recovery, one
resting on precepts of the law of obligations and the other on
precepts of the law of property; or he may have a cause of action
either under article 2315 or under article 667. Since ultra-hazard-
ous activities now give rise to a cause of action under article
2315, reliance on article 667 in such cases may be unnecessary.
But article 667 does not impose liability for ultra-hazardous
activities only, and its aspect of strict liability may furnish the
sole basis of recovery in cases in which fault under article 2315
cannot be proven.
In Chaney the activities of the parish and its contractor might
have been classified as ultra-hazardous and recovery could thus
be sustained under article 2315, as interpreted in Langlois;66 but
even if the activities were not ultra-hazardous, recovery could
be sustained under a broad interpretation of article 667. Indeed,
the word "proprietor" need not be limited to "owner." Any per-
son assuming the position of owner, usufructuary, possessor in
good or bad faith, or lessee, may qualify as proprietor by virtue
of an expansive interpretation. Moreover, the proprietor may be
liable not only for his own acts but also for the acts of others,
such as servants, either by virtue of directly applicable provi-
sions of the Civil Code 67 or by virtue of a contractual relationship.
In Robichaux v. Huppenbauer,5 question arose as to the
proper interpretation of article 669 of the Civil Code. Plaintiffs
complained of intolerable stench, noise, and pest-attracting filth
resulting from the operation of a stable in a thickly-settled neigh-
borhood and prayed for a permanent injunction. The court of
appeal affirmed a judgment granting the injunction, and the
66. See concurring opinion by Justice Tate In Chaney v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 249 So.2d 181, 187 (La. 1971).
67. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2317-2324; cf. Guillot v. Ashland Oil & Ref.
Co., 243 So.2d 820 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
68. 258 La. 139, 245 So.2d 385 (1971).
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Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs. On certiorari, the ma-
jority of the court was of the opinion that the stable operator
should be permitted to continue his operations under an injunc-
tion requiring him to spray the ground with disinfectants and
deodorizers, to cover feed bins, to remove wastes daily, to limit
the number of horses to ten, and to keep the premises drained.
Justices Hamlin and Tate dissented; Justice Barham concurred
in the result. It is regrettable that the disposition of the case by
the majority was made in the light of obscure and unnecessary
notions of the common law of nuisance.69 In a convincing and
methodologically sound concurring opinion, Justice Barham
pointed out that the result was fully compatible with article 669,
properly interpreted. 70
Conventional Servitudes.
In Conrad v. Reine,7 ' plaintiff sought an injunction for the
removal of a mobile home from a strip of ground in front of his
property. Plaintiff claimed that the strip of ground in question
was a "farm road," established by dedication. According to the
evidence, defendant had purchased certain lands "subject to the
existing servitudes on them, one of which was a 20 foot right
of way for a road (the 'road' now in question)."72 Later, defen-
dant conveyed to plaintiff's ancestor in title two lots which
"were contiguous to the 'road' and fronted the 'road' for a dis-
tance of some 105 feet. '73 Still later, a map of a subdivision
showing the "road" was recorded by the person from whom defen-
dant had purchased his lands. The court held that this evidence
was insufficient to establish substantial compliance with R.S.
9:5051, namely, formal or statutory dedication.74 Indeed, "the
69. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970
Term-Property, 31 LA. L. R-v. 196, 223 (1971); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 87, at 592
(3d ed. 1964): "There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire
law than that which surrounds the word nuisance. It has meant all things
to all men, and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an
alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie. There Is general
agreement that it is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition.
Few terms have afforded so excellent an illustration of the familiar tendency
of the courts to seize upon a catchword as a substitute for any analysis of a
problem."
70. 258 La. 139, 153, 245 So.2d 385, 391. For another case that should have
been decided under article 669 of the Civil Code, see Ritchey v. Lake Charles
Dredging & Towing Co., 230 So.2d 346 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
71. 240 So.2d 915 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
72. Id. at 916.
73. Id.
74. Cf. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970
Term-Property, 31 LA. L. REv. 196, 200 (1971).
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recordation of the subdivision had no effect on the property sold
to Mackie Reine [defendant] including the so-called 'road' be-
cause this property no longer belonged to the owner of the al-
leged subdivision." 75 The court further held that if there had
been an implied dedication, that dedication could no longer be
invoked because more than ten years had elapsed without any
use of the servitude. Accordingly, plaintiff's suit was dismissed.
One must agree with the court that there was no statutory dedi-
cation; moreover, it is obvious that there was no implied dedi-
cation.76 It would seem, however, that a conventional servitude
of passage had been created by title.7T That servitude had ex-
pired by the ten year prescription of non-use.
In Louisiana Materials Co. v. Cronvich78 plaintiff brought a
possessory action and sought a preliminary injunction requiring
parish officials to remove a barricade barring access of trucks
to plaintiff's shell yard located between the levee and the shore
of Lake Pontchartrain. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed
a judgment granting the injunction, holding that plaintiff was
not entitled to bring the possessory action, and, therefore, the
preliminary injunction should not have been issued.
The Louisiana Materials Company dredged shell from Lake
Pontchartrain, placed it on barges, and unloaded it at its shell
yard. The shell was then hauled by trucks to various destina-
tions via a ramp on the levee and a connecting parish street.
The company had obtained a "right of way" agreement from the
Pontchartrain Levee Board allowing it to handle and transport
shell on the levee property, subject to securing whatever per-
mission might be required from any affected municipal, state,
or federal agencies. The company, accordingly, had secured a
lease on a year-to-year basis from the Parish of Jefferson cover-
ing the same premises as the "right of way" from the Levee
Board. The last lease with the parish terminated in 1969, but
a parish ordinance extended the use of the right of way until
February 28, 1970. On March 1, 1970, a concrete and steel bar-
ricade was constructed on the parish right of way near the end
75. 240 So.2d 915, 917 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
76. Implied dedication requires intention by the landowner to dedicate
(frequently assimilated to "offer") and acceptance by the public. Bee A.
YUIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAw PROPERTY § 35, text accompanying nn. 187, 188 (1965),
and cases cited therein.
77. See Yiannopoulos, Predial Bervitudes; Creation by Title: Lou4siana
and Comparative Law, 45 TUL. L. Riv. 459 (1971).
78. 258 La. 1039, 249 So.2d 123 (1971).
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of the parish street, and the following day plaintiff filed this
suit. The Louisiana Materials Company contended that it occu-
pied the shell yard by virtue of a real right, namely, the right
of way agreement with the Levee Board; that its possession of
more than a year had been disturbed by the erection of the barri-
cade; and that it was entitled to have its access to the public
street protected by a mandatory injunction. The Parish of Jef-
ferson contended that the possessory action was unavailable be-
cause plaintiff had not been in possession for a period of one
year; moreover, it asserted legal authority to erect the barricade
under its broad powers of regulating and controlling the use of
its public streets.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the possessory ac-
tion was unavailable because plaintiff did not possess the levee
property as owner or by virtue of a real right. The right of way
agreement, even if it had conferred a real right,7 9 terminated
February 28, 1970, because it was conditioned upon parish author-
ization. Thereafter, plaintiff had no right to possession. Nor
could plaintiff claim possession for a year adversely to the par-
ish: until February 28, 1970, plaintiff occupied the position of
a lessee and could not question the title of the lessor. Further,
the supreme court held that the parish had full authority to
regulate the use of its streets; and, since the street leading to the
shell yard was generally limited to vehicles weighing less than
three tons, all trucks, whether empty or loaded, were excluded.
The limitation was a reasonable exercise of regulatory power.
This second ground of decision constitutes the true disposition
of the case. Because, assuming arguendo that plaintiff company
had possessed the shell yard by virtue of a real right for more
than a year, the parish could still prohibit the use of its streets
by any trucks which violated a general regulation. Plaintiff
might have grounds to complain only if the parish had violated
a contractual right or a real right that the plaintiff had for the
use of parish streets. But plaintiff did not have such a right.
Building Restrictions
Building restrictions may be either veritable predial servi-
79. For a discussion of the question whether administrative bodies may
confer real rights on property of the public domain, see Yiannopoulos,
Predial SertAtudes; General Principles: Loui4ana and Comparative Law,
29 LA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1968).
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tudes ° or sui generis real rights akin to predial servitudes.,'
Building restrictions that are qualified as sui generis real rights
are governed by the general rules applicable to predial servi-
tudes, subject to exceptions established by special legislation or
jurisprudence. These exceptions relate to the creation, enforce-
ment, or termination of building restrictions.
Validity of Building Restrictions
In Oak Ridge Builders, Inc. v. Bryant, 2 question arose as
to the validity of building restrictions limiting an area to residen-
tial uses contrary to ordinances that had zoned the same area as
commercial. In this case, the area had been zoned commercial
in 1956; restrictions limiting the area to residential uses were
recorded in 1964; and a new ordinance was adopted again
zoning the area commercial. The 1968 ordinance stated that it
did not intend to interfere with pre-existing restrictions, and
appellant admitted that a zoning ordinance does not supersede
pre-existing restrictions. He argued, however, that the 1956
ordinance prevented the establishment of more burdensome re-
strictions than those provided in that ordinance. The court con-
sidered this argument to be res nova and held that the 1956
ordinance established merely a permissive use of property within
that zone. Since individuals are free to derogate from permissive
rules of law, the restrictions were valid and binding. There
should be no doubt that zoning ordinances neither terminate
nor supersede existing building restrictions.83 For example, the
zoning of a restricted residential area as commercial does not
prevent the enforcement of existing restrictions; it may merely
give rise to an inference that the general plan has been aban-
80. Restrictions imposed on individual lots without regard to a general
development plan constitute veritable predial servitudes, provided, of course,
that the requirements for the creation of predial servitudes are met. See
McGuffy v. Weill, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960); Yiannopoulos, Real
Rights: Limits of Contractual and Testamentary Freedom, 30 LA. L. REV.
44, 61 (1969).
81. According to firmly established Louisiana jurisprudence, building
restrictions that may not qualify as predial servitudes under the Civil Code
are sui generis real rights in the framework of subdivision planning. See,
e.g., Guyton v. Yancey, 240 La. 794, 125 So.2d 365 (1961); Edwards v. Wise-
man, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941); Community Builders, Inc. v. Scarbrough,
149 So.2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); A. YIANNOPOULOS, CiviL LAW PROPERTY
§ 104 (1965).
82. 252 So.2d 169 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
83. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1945(2); Alfortish v. Wagner, 200 La. 198, 7
So.2d 708 (1942); Olivier v. Bergreen, 136 So.2d 325 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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doned in the area.!4 The converse, however, is not necessarily
true. Zoning ordinances affecting previously unrestricted areas
involve a valid exercise of police power and ought to exclude the
freedom of landowners to establish restrictions that are incom-
patible with the public acts. 85
Matters of Interpretation
Documents establishing building restrictions are subject to
the general rules of the Louisiana Civil Code governing the
interpretation of juridical acts. 6 Since, however, building re-
strictions are rights akin to predial servitudes, documents estab-
lishing such restrictions are subject to strict interpretation by
analogous application of article 753 of the Civil Code. This
article declares that doubts as to the extent or manner of using
servitudes must be resolved "in favor of the owner of the prop-
erty to be affected."8
In Oak Ridge Builders, Inc. v. Bryant,8 question arose also
as to the interpretation of a building restriction declaring that
"no noxious, offensive, unsanitary, unsightly or unusually noisy
activity or business may be carried on upon any lot, nor shall
anything be done thereon that might be considered a nuisance
to the neighborhood." On the basis of this restriction, landown-
ers brought action to enjoin defendant from operating a beauty
parlor in her home. Defendant argued that only noxious or offen-
sive business activities were excluded, and that the operation of
a beauty parlor did not fall into that category. The court held
that the instrument as a whole made it clear that the subdivision
was limited to single family residential dwellings and prohibited
the carrying on of any kind of business activity as such. This
interpretation might be plausible on the basis of "the instrument
as a whole," which had not been reproduced in the opinion. But
the quoted paragraph alone, given strict interpretation as it
should, does not support the court's conclusion.
84. Cf. Munson v. Berdon, 51 So.2d 157 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
85. Cf. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 11, 12; Ransome v. Police Jury of Parish of
Jefferson, 216 La. 994, 45 So.2d 601 (1950); Yiannopoulos, Real Rights: Limits
of Contractual and Testamentary Freedom, 30 LA. L. REv. 44, 73 (1969).
86. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1712-1723, 1945-1962; cf. Salerno v. DeLucca,
211 La. 659, 30 So.2d 678 (1947).
87. LA. CIv. CODE art. 753. See also Fatjo v. Mayer, 247 La. 327, 170 So.2d
859 (1965); Leonard v. Lavigne, 245 La. 1004, 162 So.2d 341 (1964); McGuffy
v. Well, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960).
88. 252 So.2d 169, 170 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
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Termination
According to special legislation, actions to enjoin or to ob-
tain damages for a violation of a building restriction are subject
to a two-year liberative prescription that begins to run upon the
commission of a violation."9 Courts interpreting the statute,
however, have correctly declared that the prescriptive period
begins to run upon the commencement of a noticeable viola-
tion. 0 Thus, an activity pursued on a modest scale may not be
noticeable, or may not be a violation at all; but the same type
of activity, if expanded, could become a noticeable violation.91
Application of these rules is illustrated in Oak Ridge Builders,
Inc. v. Bryant.92 In this case, defendant had been styling ladies'
hair in her home; for a number of years she had only one cus-
tomer at a time, or occasionally two, and only in 1970 did she
begin a full scale business operation on the premises as a licensed
beautician. When landowners brought an action for injunction
claiming violation of a restriction that excluded commercial
uses, defendant argued that the two-year prescription under
R.S. 9:5622 had run. The court properly held that defendant's
activities until 1970 did not amount to the operation of a busi-
ness sufficient to toll the running of prescription.
In LeBlanc v. Bowen,03 a recorded restriction declared that
"no commercial establishment, nor dairy, nor noxious or offen-
sive establishment shall be erected or maintained." Plaintiffs,
landowners in the subdivision, brought action to enjoin the
erection of a service station in violation of the restriction. De-
fendants argued that the action had prescribed by application
of R.S. 9:5622, because a trailer sales company had been allowed
to park trailers on the premises for a period in excess of two
89. See LA. R.S. 9:5622 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 448, § 1.
The prescription does not merely bar actions for the enforcement of build-
ing restrictions as sui generis real rights; it extinguishes the real right itself
in the same way that the prescription of non-use extinguishes the right
of servitude. For an extensive discussion, see Yiannopoulos, Real Rights:
Limits of Contractual and Testamentary Freedom, 30 LA. L. REv. 44, 70 (1969).
90. See Roche v. St. Roumain, 51 So.2d 666 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951). It
suffices for the commencement of the prescription that the violation of re-
strictions is neither secretive nor clandestine. See Fatjo v. Mayer, 247 La. 327
170 So.2d 859 (1965).
91. See Woodley v. Cinquigranna, 188 So.2d 701 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966)
(activities of a door to door salesman did not violate restrictions limiting
the property to residential use, but the activities of the same defendant as
field manager for door to door salesmen violated the restrictions).
92. 252 So.2d 169 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
93. 238 So.2d 369 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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years. The trial court held that the use of the property by the
trailer company did not amount to the erection of a commercial
establishment; hence, there was no violation of the restriction.
The court of appeal, however, held that the restriction was in-
tended "to prevent, not only the construction of a building or
structure from which a commercial venture could be conducted,
but also to prohibit the use of the property for any commercial
purpose. '94 Since the property had been used for commercial
purposes, plaintiffs' action had prescribed. The decision is im-
portant because it reiterates the rule that activities in violation
of restrictions free the property not only from limitations re-
lating to the particular use that has been practiced, but from
all limitations relating to commercial use. 5
Usufruct
Prohibited Substitutions and Usufruct
The question whether a will establishes a usufruct rather
than a prohibited substitution is an ever-recurring problem in
Louisiana.9 6 In Succession of McCrary,9 7 the testator bequeathed
to his wife all his property "so long as she does live," and ques-
tion arose as to whether this language established a usufruct
or intended to convey full ownership for the lifetime of the lega-
tee, allegedly a prohibited substitution. The court apparently sub-
scribed to the theory that the intention of the testator controls
in this matter,98 and, by looking to language in the will, arrived
at the conclusion that the testator did not intend to vest owner-
ship in a first donee for life which on the first donee's death was
to be transmitted to a second donee. Further, the court seemed
to suggest that in accordance with article 1712 of the Civil Code
a will ought to be declared valid whenever this is possible, even
at the cost of strained interpretation. It is submitted that the
testator in the case under consideration, probably a layman un-
mindful of the intricacies of the Louisiana law of successions,
94. Id. at 370.
95. See Cush v. South Acres Missionary Baptist Church, Inc., 194 So.2d
788 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967); Chexnayder v. Rogers, 95 So.2d 381 (La. App.
Or. Cir. 1957).
96. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 15 (1968).
97. 246 So.2d 899 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
98. See Succession of Thilborger, 234 La. 810, 101 So.2d 678 (1958); Suc-
cession of Johnson, 223 La. 1058, 67 So.2d 591 (1953); Girven v. Miller, 219
La. 252, 52 So.2d 843 (1951); Succession of Fertel, 208 La. 614, 23 So.2d 234
(1945); Succession of Blossom, 194 La. 635, 194 So. 572 (1940).
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intended to convey to his wife the full ownership of his property
for the duration of her life. According to civilian principles this
is a substitution do eo quod supererit that is not prohibited by
article 1520 of the Civil CodeY9 The first donee is not charged
with the obligation to preserve the property and restore it to a
second donee; the second donee merely takes whatever is left
at the end of the first donee's enjoyment of the property.
Perfect and Imperfect Usufruct
In Succession of Chauvin,100 question arose as to whether an
optional share savings account in a homestead association is sub-
ject to perfect or imperfect usufruct. The court saw "no dis-
tinction between a savings account in a bank or in a homestead
from the standpoint of determining the nature of the usufruct
thereon,"''1 and held that the usufruct of the account in ques-
tion was imperfect. Application for writs on this issue was re-
fused by the Louisiana Supreme Court.0 2 It is submitted that
the stock of building and loan associations involves distinct
considerations as it bears characteristics both of ordinary stock,
which is subject to perfect usufruct, and of an indebtedness,
which is subject to an imperfect usufruct.0 3 In the absence of
compelling reasons for the classification of building and loan
association stock as consumable, and taking into account primarily
the interests of the naked owner, the usufruct of this stock should
be considered as perfect.'" 4
Testamentary and Legal Usufruct
In Succession of Chauvin,0 5 testator left his entire estate to
his only son subject to a usufruct in favor of his wife. The
entire estate consisted of the testator's half interest in the com-
munity of acquets and gains. When the surviving spouse re-
married, the son filed a rule directing his mother to show cause
99. Article 1520 prohibits legacies whereby "the donee, the heir, or legatee
is charged to preserve for and to return a thing to a third person." (Emphasis
added.) Cf. In re Courtin, 144 La. 971, 81 So. 457 (1919); Michel v. Beale, 10
La. Ann. 352 (1855).
100. 242 So.2d 340 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
101. Id. at 344.
102. 257 La. 862, 244 So.2d 612 (1971).
103. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 31, . ext a.cco-.panying n.
193 (1968).
104. Cf. Succession of Wengert, 180 La. 483, 156 So. -73 (1934) (homestead
stock dealt with as if it were subject to perfect usufru ,t).
105. 242 So.2d 340 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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why her usufruct should not be declared terminated by appli-
cation of article 916 of the Civil Code. He argued, on the author-
ity of Succession of Moore,10 6 that the confirmation of a legal
usufruct by will does not convert it into a testamentary usu-
fruct, and, therefore, the confirmed usufruct ceases upon the
remarriage of the usufructuary. The usufructuary argued, on
the authority of Smith v. Nelson10 7 and Succession of Carbajal,10 8
that a legal usufruct confirmed by will is testamentary; hence,
it does not terminate upon remarriage. The Court of Appeal for
the Fourth Circuit held that according to the jurisprudence' 0 9
a legal usufruct confirmed by will does not terminate upon re-
marriage; further, the court held that after remarriage of the
usufructuary the disposition in favor of the surviving spouse
ought to be limited by application of article 1493 of the Civil
Code, so as not to "burden the one-third legitime due to the
forced heir.""'  On this issue, the Louisiana Supreme Court
granted certiorari."' This writer has refrained in the past from
commenting on cases pending before the Louisiana Supreme
Court. The Chauvin case, however, involves such intricate ques-
tions of law that comments are unavoidable. Without intending
to prejudice the position of litigants, the following propositions
are offered for what they may be worth:
In Louisiana, a usufruct may be either testamentary or legal.
It is testamentary when created by mortis causa juridical act;
it is legal when created by the operation of law. Classification
of a usufruct as legal or testamentary carries significant conse-
quences concerning the usufructuary's duty to give security, lia-
bility for inheritance taxes, termination of the usufruct upon
remarriage, and impingement on the legitime of forced heirs.
If the usufruct is legal, it terminates upon remarriage according
to article 916 of the Civil Code; the usufructuary is not liable
for the payment of inheritance taxes according to fiscal legisla-
tion, as interpreted by Louisiana courts;1 12 the usufructuary is
relieved of the obligation to give security by application of
106. 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888).
107. 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908).
108. 154 La. 1060, 98 So. 666 (1924).
109. The two casesj cited by the court were Smith v. Nelson, 121 La. 170,
46 So. 200 (1908) and Succession of CarbaJal, 154 La. 1060, 98 So. 666 (1924).
For a critique, see teg,. accompanying note 125 infra.
110. Succession of 3Chauvin, 242 So.2d 340, 343 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
111. 257 La. 855, 244 So.2d 609 (1971).
112. Succession of Marsal, 118 La. 212, 42 So. 778 (1907).
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article 560 of the Civil Code; and the usufruct does not violate
the legitime of forced heirs.118 If, on the other hand, the usu-
fruct is testamentary, the opposite results follow. Thus, a testa-
mentary usufruct does not terminate upon remarriage ;114 the
usufructuary owes taxes;"I5 in the absence of testamentary dis-
pensation, the usufructuary must furnish security;" 6 and, it ought
to clearly follow that a testamentary usufruct may impinge on
the legitime of forced heirs.117
The distinction between testamentary and legal usufruct has
been blurred by the judicial doctrine of "confirmation" of a legal
usufruct by will. Article 916 of the Civil Code establishes the
legal usufruct in favor of the surviving spouse in community
"when the predeceased husband or wife . . .shall not have dis-
posed by last will and testament, of his or her share in the com-
munity property." (Emphasis added.) Early Louisiana deci-
sions have held that any disposition by will defeats the legal usu-
fruct under article 916.118 These cases have been overruled by
a long line of decisions establishing the proposition that the
legal usufruct under article 916 may be defeated only by a dis-
position that is "adverse" to the interests of the surviving spouse.
A disposition that is not adverse to the interests of the surviving
spouse merely "confirms" the legal usufruct." 9
The doctrine of confirmation of a legal usufruct by will
has no statutory foundation; article 916 of the Civil Code does
not contain the word "adverse" and its obvious interpretation
is that any testamentary disposition excludes the legal usufruct.
Moreover, the doctrine of confirmation is an anomalous theo-
retical construction that has unduly complicated the Louisiana
law of successions, as it gives rise to the troublesome question
whether a legal usufruct confirmed by will is "legal" or "testa-
mentary." Indeed, it might be simpler to accept the view that
any testamentary disposition excludes the legal usufruct under
article 916. Nevertheless, the doctrine of confirmation is deeply
113. Succession of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888).
114. Smith v. Nelson, 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908).
115. Succession of Eisenmann, 170 So.2d 913 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
116. Succession of Carlisi, 217 La. 675, 47 So.2d 42 (1950).
117. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1499; A. YIANNOPOULos, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 16
(1968).
118. Succession of Schiller, 33 La. Ann. 1 (1881); Forstall v. Forstall, 28
La. Ann. 197 (1876); Grayson v. Sanford, 12 La. Ann. 646 (1957).
119. Succession of Maloney, 127 La. 913, 54 So. 146 (1911); Fricke v. Staf-
ford, 159 So.2d 52 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963); A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SER-
VITUDES § 103 (1968).
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imbedded in Louisiana jurisprudence and favors strongly the
interests of the surviving spouse. In practical terms, this doc-
trine allows the surviving spouse to cumulate the rights under
article 916 of the Civil Code and those under the will of the de-
ceased spouse.1'
Assuming that the doctrine of confirmation is here to stay,
the basic question is whether a confirmed legal usufruct ought
to be classified as "legal" or "testamentary." In this respect
there are conflicting determinations. For purposes of taxation,
Louisiana courts have reached the conclusion that the mere con-
firmation of the legal usufruct does not change the nature of
the usufruct into a testamentary one; it remains "legal" and in-
heritance taxes are thereby avoided.121 Insofar as the usufruc-
tuary's obligation to give security is concerned, the usufruct
that has been confirmed by will presumably is regarded as
"legal," and the survivor is dispensed with the duty to give
security.122 In cases involving the question of infringement of
the legitime, Louisiana courts have likewise reached the con-
clusion that the mere confirmation of the legal usufruct does not
change its nature. It remains legal; hence, the legitime of the
issue of the marriage is not violated. This was one of the main
issues in Succession of Moore.128 But in cases involving the
question whether a confirmed legal usufruct terminates upon
the remarriage of the usufructuary, lower courts and commen-
tators have reached the conclusion that the usufruct is "testa-
mentary" in order to exclude its termination upon the remar-
riage of the usufructuary. In my view, there is neither law,
reason, nor controlling authority for this inconsistency.
The conclusion that a confirmed usufruct is "testamentary"
and does not terminate upon remarriage allegedly rests on two
Louisiana Supreme Court decisions, Smith v. Nelson 2 4 and Suc-
cession of Carbajal.125 These are the cases cited and discussed
by the court in Succession of Chauvin. Actually, neither deci-
120. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 104 (1968).
121. See Succession of Baker, 129 La. 74, 55 So. 714 (1911); Succession of
Brown, 94 So.2d 317 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957); Succession of Lynch, 145 So.2d
42 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932); A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 17 (1968).
122. Cf. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 233 La. 67, 96 So.2d 44 (1957); Succession
of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888); A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SER-
VITUDES § 61 (1968).
123. 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888).
124. 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908).
125. 154 La. 1060, 98 So. 666 (1924).
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sion supports the conclusion. In Smith v. Nelson, testatrix be-
queathed to her second spouse the usufruct of her share in the
second community, leaving the naked ownership to children of
a former marriage. Article 916 of the Civil Code was clearly
inapplicable because the naked owners were not the issue of that
marriage; hence, the usufruct was clearly testamentary and the
court correctly held that it had been granted for life. There was
no question of confirmation of the legal usufruct by will. In
Succession of Carbajal, the court merely declared in a per curiam
opinion that "the will being valid, the usufruct of the whole
estate, given by will, continues despite the second marriage;
only the legal usufruct ceases upon second marriage.' 1 26 There
is no indication that the property was community; moreover,
the language of the will was not reproduced by the court and
the citation of Nelson indicates that the court was concerned
with a purely testamentary usufruct. In my view, therefore,
there is no controlling Louisiana authority for the proposition
that a legal usufruct confirmed by will is testamentary and does
not terminate upon the remarriage of the usufructuary. On the
contrary, in Succession of Moore, the supreme court declared
pointedly: "Next, Mrs. Moore will be entitled to the usufruct
of the remaining share of the deceased in community during
her widowhood, under the law, as confirmed by the will... [the
decree therefore ordered] that Mrs. Moore be declared entitled,
during her widowhood, to the usufruct of the share of her hus-
band, inherited by the issue of their marriage .... "127 (Emphasis
added.) In conclusion, the matter of termination of a con-
firmed usufruct by remarriage of the usufructuary is res nova
before the supreme court and decision depends on a proper in-
terpretation of article 916.
Consistent and even-handed administration of justice should
result in the treatment of a confirmed usufruct as legal or testa-
mentary for all purposes. The question whether a confirmed usu-
fruct is legal or testamentary may be resolved by application of
the following tests: "If the testator intended to give to the sur-
vivor the same rights that the law would have accorded him in
the absence of a will, the survivor's usufruct is legal . . . . If,
126. Id. at 1068, 98 So. at 669, citing Smith v. Nelson, supra note 124.
127. 40 La. Ann. 531, 542, 4 So. 460, 466 (1888).
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on the other hand, the intention of the testator was to alter the
scheme of intestate succession and to give to the survivor addi-
tional rights, the usufruct ought to be classified as testamen-
tary."'' 28 These tests have been applied in effect, by Louisiana
courts. Thus, it has been consistently held that a truly testa-
mentary usufruct in favor of the surviving spouse does not ter-
minate upon remarriage ;129 the surviving spouse as testamen-
tary usufructuary owes taxes;130 finally, in the absence of dis-
pensation, the surviving spouse as testamentary usufructuary
must give security.''
In Succession of Chauvin, the testator left the usufruct of
his share in the community to his wife under circumstances in
which article 916 of the Civil Code would normally be appli-
cable. The court may find that the testator did not intend to
alter the scheme of intestate succession in any respect and,
according to a long line of Louisiana decisions, the testator may
be deemed to have merely confirmed the operation of article
916. If so, the usufruct ought to be classified as legal for all per-
tinent purposes, including termination upon remarriage.
If, on the other hand, the court should find that the inten-
tion of the testator was to grant to the survivor rights beyond
those conferred upon him by article 916, the usufruct is testa-
mentary. This might be a plausible interpretation of the will;
indeed, if a person makes a will, he usually intends to alter the
scheme of intestate succession. Thus, if the testator intended
to grant to the survivor a usufruct for life, going beyond the
terms of article 916, this usufruct is testamentary. It does not
terminate upon remarriage, but it may impinge on the legitime.
If it in fact impinges on the legitime, it does so from the time
the usufruct is established and not merely from the time of the
remarriage. In case the donation is excessive, it must be reduced
by the application of article 1499 rather than article 1493 of the
Civil Code.182
128. A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 105, at 349-50 (1968).
129. Smith v. Nelson, 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908).
130. Succession of Eisenmann, 170 So.2d 913 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965),
writs refused, 247 La. 489, 172 So.2d 294.
131. Succession of Carlisi, 217 La. 675, 47 So.2d 42 (1950).
132. The procedure is discussed extensively in A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL
SERVrrUDES § 16 (1968).
